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The Promissory Character of
Adequate Assurances of Performance
Michael J. Borden†
INTRODUCTION
The central questions of contract law and theory focus
on the enforceability of promises.1 For the contract theorist, the
question takes the form, why should the law enforce promises?
For the lawyer, the question may often be, which promises will
the law enforce? For parties to contracts, the salient question is
often, what will happen if I (or my counterpart) fail to honor
my promise? Implicit in each of these questions is both an ex
ante and an ex post perspective: we care about whether certain
utterances will be deemed worthy of the law’s attention, but we
also care about how the law will respond to a broken promise.
For the theorist, the ex ante and ex post questions are
often intertwined, for one cannot satisfactorily articulate a
rationale for enforcing promises without taking into account
the consequences for the promisee if a promise were broken
and the law provided no remedy. Students of contract law learn
that the doctrinal bases of contractual obligation
(consideration, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment)
correspond with the measures of damages (expectation,
reliance, restitution).
It is thus not surprising that so much scholarly
attention is devoted to questions of enforceability and damages.
Yet there is one doctrine in contract law that lies at the
intersection of these two questions that has received very little
attention in literature, and no attention whatsoever for its ex
†

Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University. This article benefitted from the input of the participants at the
Fourth International Conference on Contract Law, the Central States Legal
Scholarship Conference, and the Indiana University (Indianapolis) Law School Faculty
Scholarship Colloquium. I also appreciate the excellent research assistance of Ashleigh
Elscesser and the financial support of the Cleveland-Marshall Fund.
1
Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1107, 1112 (1984) (“The first great issue in contract law is what kinds of
promises the law should enforce . . . .”).

167

168

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

ante implications. The subject of this article is the doctrine of
adequate assurances of performance. The doctrine is an
innovation of twentieth-century contract law and functions as a
mechanism to assist in sorting out the consequences of
prospective non-performance.
In contract law, a breach cannot occur until the time for
performance has passed. But sometimes, it becomes obvious
that one party is not going to perform. When that happens, the
injured party often would like to pack it in and declare the
contract at an end. But doing so poses risks. If the injured
party jumps the gun and stops performing prematurely, he
risks being deemed to have breached the contract himself. One
way that contract law responds to this dilemma is through the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation. Under this doctrine,
certain actions may constitute a present breach even before the
time for performance has passed. A promisor commits a
present breach by anticipatory repudiation when he either
unequivocally expresses his intention not to perform his
contractual obligations, or intentionally takes some action that
renders such performance impossible. Anticipatory repudiation
helps disappointed promisees to efficiently organize their
affairs and find alternative arrangements, without having to
wait until a performance deadline that may be fairly distant.
But anticipatory repudiation can be a trap. An
impatient promisee might misconstrue signals from an
underperforming promisor as a repudiation when no legally
cognizable repudiation has, in fact, occurred.2 In such a case,
the injured promisor who thought he was entitled to move on
from an impaired relationship may find himself liable for
breach of contract. A well-counseled promisee who believes that
his contractual partner will not perform, but who is not certain
that he has received the requisite unequivocal statement of
intention not to perform that constitutes an anticipatory
repudiation, can pursue another avenue to extricate himself
from a troubled contract.
When adopted in 1961, Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code introduced to American contract law the
doctrine of adequate assurances to address the problem of the

2

See McCloskey & Co. v. Minweld Steel Co., 220 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1955);
Taylor v. Johnston, 539 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1975); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 8.20, at 662-66 (4th ed. 2004).

2010]

ADEQUATE ASSURANCES OF PERFORMANCE

169

insecure party.3 A promisee who has “reasonable grounds for
insecurity” about the other party’s ability or willingness to
perform “may demand in a record adequate assurance of due
performance and until the party receives the assurance may if
commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which
he has not already received the agreed return.”4 Often,
assurances are utterly straightforward, with the promisor
merely affirming his intention to perform his contractual
obligations. Sometimes, however, they involve new
undertakings, such as a promise to furnish a personal guaranty
or other measures to assuage the promisee’s insecurity. If the
promisor does not promptly give the required assurances, he is
deemed to have repudiated the contract, which means that the
insecure party becomes entitled to stop performing. His
remaining obligations are discharged and he can get on with
his life. The purpose of the doctrine is thus to relieve the
insecure party of the risk and uncertainty involved in relying
on anticipatory repudiation as an avenue to a finding of breach.
In effect, invoking the doctrine shifts the burden to the underperforming promisor to affirm his intention to perform.
What little has been written on the subject of adequate
assurances has focused on analyzing its design and
effectiveness as a little dance that contracting parties engage
in on the road to a finding of breach or repudiation, or its
effectiveness in helping the parties avoid such outcomes.5
Similarly, the case law generated by the doctrine (some two
hundred and fifty cases) has almost entirely centered on the
fact-intensive issues of whether a promisee actually had
reasonable grounds for insecurity, whether she had properly
made her demand for assurances, or whether the assurances
demanded were inappropriate.6 In contract law casebooks, the
doctrine is invariably included in the materials on
3

See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and
the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987).
4
U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (revised 2003).
5
See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Insecurity, Repudiation, and Cure, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 339 (1990); Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk,
Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71 (1998); Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the
Deal Together After Material Breach—Common Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 553 (1976); Keith A. Rowley,
A Brief History of Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law, 69 U. CIN. L.
REV. 565 (2001); Celia R. Taylor, Self-Help in Contract Law: An Exploration and
Proposal, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839 (1998); James J. White, Eight Cases and
Section 251, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 841 (1982).
6
See infra notes 31-57 and accompanying text.
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consequences of non-performance and remedies.7 To read all of
the available primary and secondary source material on the
doctrine, one would think that it relates solely, and not in a
terribly important way, to the back-end component of the
enforceability question that lies at the heart of contract law.
But contract scholars have entirely missed the fact that
the doctrine of adequate assurances implicates that most
fundamental question of contract law: which promises are
worthy of the law’s enforcement apparatus. In this article, I recharacterize the doctrine as one with significant implications
for the question of which promises the law should enforce. My
aim is to focus readers’ attention on the promissory character
of adequate assurances. By this I mean that I wish to
investigate whether the undertakings contained in some of the
more substantial assurances are properly to be considered
promises with their own independent validity; that is,
contracts. Contracts that can be sued on and give rise to
damages apart from those that could be recovered under the
parties’ original agreement. Contracts that stand alone and
endure in force even after the original contract from which they
arose has ceased to be in effect; or whether they should be
conceived of as modifications of the original contract, or
perhaps neither.
Part I provides the reader with an account of the
development of the doctrine of adequate assurances from its
earliest roots in the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation. Part
II explains the workings of the modern doctrine in the context
of a recent case. In Part III, I argue that promises made in
response to a demand for adequate assurances can be
understood as a class of enforceable promises. In Parts IV and
V, I attempt to work out the back-end consequences that would
result from treating assurances as enforceable promises.8

7

See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS, CASES AND DOCTRINE 900-05
(4th ed. 2008); CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE,
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 839-40 (6th ed. 2007); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A.
HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION 864-80 (4th ed. 2001).
8
This article is conceived as the first of a pair. Its focus is primarily
doctrinal (arguing that adequate assurances can be understood as enforceable
promises) and practical (considering the consequences of such an understanding). The
follow-up article examines the theoretical implications raised by this article.
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DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND

The roots of the doctrine of adequate assurances lie in
the legal and analytical quandary that confronts a party to a
contract who awaits performance from an obligor who seems
unlikely to perform.9 This dilemma arises from the fact that
until the time for performance has passed, contract law, as a
matter of both logic and doctrine, deems that no breach can
occur, for the obligor might still perform his contractual
obligations in a timely manner.10 If I hire a neighborhood
teenager to mow my lawn on Saturday, he has until Saturday
to perform. If he tells me on Thursday evening that his friend
is about to leave for the beach for the weekend and he is
thinking about joining him, he has not breached. He can only
breach by failing to mow my lawn on Saturday.
So what am I to do? I need my lawn trimmed on
Saturday. If I do not arrange for a substitute mower soon, I
may be stuck with an ill-kempt lawn for my garden party.
Common sense would suggest that as soon as I see my young
friend load his beach bag into his friend’s car, I should call
another enterprising local youth and arrange to have her come
and cut the grass. But if I do so, and the original obligor feels
the pangs of conscience and returns to honor his contract, I will
be obligated to pay both the replacement and the prodigal. If I
refuse to perform my part of the original contract, the law will
hold me liable for breach of contract. Thus, an obligee who
encounters a contracting partner who appears unwilling to
perform faces a significant legal risk that impedes his ability to
efficiently plan his affairs. This problem is not new, nor is the
legal doctrine that purports to address it.
A similar dilemma faced the plaintiff in Hochster v. De
la Tour,11 the English case that is widely considered to have
established the modern law of anticipatory repudiation.12 In
April 1852, Hochster and De la Tour entered into a contract
9

Garvin, supra note 5, at 71-76.
See generally Alan G. Dowling, A Right to Adequate Assurance of
Performance in All Transactions: U.C.C. § 2-609 Beyond Sales of Goods, 48 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1358, 1358-59 (1975).
11
(1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B.); 2 El. & Bl. 678.
12
In his excellent article tracing the origins of the law of anticipatory
repudiation, Keith Rowley explains that the common wisdom that treats Hochster as
the fountainhead of anticipatory repudiation is mistaken. He discusses several cases in
America and England that predate Hochster in recognizing the right to sue for breach
before the time for performance. To trace the earliest roots of anticipatory repudiation,
see Rowley, supra note 5, at 571-600.
10
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whereby De la Tour would employ Hochster as a courier for
three months, beginning on June 1, 1852 at a rate of 10 pounds
per month.13 On May 11, 1852, De la Tour informed Hochster
that he had made other arrangements and would not be
honoring the contract.14 Hochster sued De la Tour on May 22,
1852.15 He argued that De la Tour’s renunciation of his promise
constituted a breach of the contract, even though the time for
performance had not yet arrived.16 De la Tour’s answer,
naturally, was that there could be no breach before the first of
June.17 After the jury found for Hochster, De la Tour moved to
arrest the judgment.18
De la Tour argued that to prevail in his suit, Hochster
would have to stand “ready and willing” to perform the entire
contract to its conclusion.19 He insisted that by finding other
similar employment, Hochster had forfeited his right to sue on
the contract.20 While this argument may sound almost silly to
the modern ear, it was fully consonant with the legal
environment of the day. Consider Justice Holmes’ roughly
contemporaneous observation that “the degree of [the
promisor’s] ability at any moment before he was called on to
pay [is] no concern of the [promisee].”21
The Lord Chief Justice disagreed with the defendant,
and in so doing, he initiated a major change in Anglo-American
law:
If the plaintiff has no remedy for breach of the contract unless he
treats the contract as in force, and acts upon it down to the 1st June
1852, it follows that, till then, he must enter into no employment
which will interfere with his promise “to start with the defendant on
such travels on the day and year,” and that he must then be properly
equipped in all respects as a courier for a three months’ tour on the
continent of Europe. But it is surely much more rational, and more
for the benefit of both parties, that, after renunciation of the
agreement by the defendant, the plaintiff should be at liberty to
consider himself absolved from any future performance of it,
retaining his right to sue for any damage he has suffered from the
breach of it. Thus, instead of remaining idle and laying out money in
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Hochster, 118 Eng. Rep. at 922.
See id. at 924.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 926-27.
Lowe v. Harwood, 29 N.E. 538, 539 (Mass. 1885).
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preparations which must be useless, he is at liberty to seek service
under another employer, which would go in mitigation of the
damages to which he would otherwise be entitled for a breach of
contract.22

As for Hochster’s right to an immediate remedy, the
court noted that
The man who wrongfully renounces a contract into which he has
deliberately entered cannot justly complain if he is immediately sued
. . . by the man whom he has injured: and it seems reasonable to
allow an option to the injured party, either to sue immediately, or to
wait till the time when the act was to be done, still holding it as
prospectively binding for the exercise of this option, which may be
advantageous to the innocent party, and cannot be prejudicial to the
wrongdoer.23

Today’s lawyers and law students are well aware of the
modern legal response to this problem: anticipatory
repudiation. According to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, “[w]here an obligor repudiates a duty before he has
committed a breach by non-performance and before he has
received all of the agreed exchange for it, his repudiation alone
gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach.”24 This terse
provision neatly summarizes the current doctrine that aims to
resolve my conflict with my derelict neighbor.
But my problem has not completely gone away. For
another provision of the Restatement explains what counts as a
repudiation.
A repudiation is
(a) a statement by the obligor to the obligee indicating that the
obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give the obligee a
claim for damages for total breach under §243 or
(b) a voluntary affirmative act which renders the obligor unable or
apparently unable to perform without such breach.25

The cases applying the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation have consistently held that an obligor must
manifest an unambiguous intention “not to perform except on
conditions which go beyond the contract” before he will be

22
23
24
25

Hochster, 118 Eng. Rep. at 926.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253(1) (1981).
Id. § 250.
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deemed to have repudiated.26 So where does that leave me on
Thursday evening? The teenager has only told me that he is
thinking about going to the beach. He has not said when he
will return. He has not said that he will not perform. Perhaps
his words and actions have amounted to a repudiation; perhaps
not. Thus the law of repudiation has addressed one problem
and introduced another. By inviting the obligee to treat a
repudiation as a present breach, the doctrine has replaced a
regime that, for all its flaws, at least provided a form of
certainty (no breach can occur before the time for performance
has passed) with a doctrine that simply shifts the locus of legal
risk to the calculation of whether or not the obligor has indeed
committed a repudiation. If the obligee is found to have been
mistaken about the repudiation, he will likely have committed
a breach himself.
So again, where does all this leave me on Thursday
evening? According to Karl Llewellyn, it leaves me feeling
insecure. Llewellyn recognized that the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation was unsatisfactory in the way we have just
described. He was sensitive to the commercial concerns of the
promisee who doubts the willingness or ability of the promisor
to perform, but who cannot avail himself of the remedy of
present breach by anticipatory repudiation, or at least has
concerns about his ability to resort to that doctrine.
In 1941, when Llewellyn led the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in its endeavor to craft
what became Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, he
included in his first draft a provision that proved to be contract
law’s first recognition of the concept of insecurity.27 This first
tentative step was a provision that stated that a buyer on
credit warrants to its seller that it “will give the seller no
reasonable grounds for insecurity in regard to his continuing
ability and willingness to perform.”28 Effectively, this iteration
of the concept of insecurity would have created an implied term
that could be sued upon if breached. But this initial, limited

26

Id. § 250 cmt. 3 (citing U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 2 (revised 2003)).
See AN ACT RELATING TO SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND TO
CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE THEREOF, AND TO RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND REMEDIES
ARISING OUT OF SUCH SALES OR CONTRACTS AND IN CONNECTION WITH FINANCING OR
OTHER TRANSACTIONS COMMONLY ASSOCIATED THEREWITH, AND TO MAKE UNIFORM
THE LAW OF SUCH MATTERS § 16-C (1941), reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 3 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly & Ann Puckett eds., 1995).
28
Id. at 73.
27
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provision grew into a much more complete remedy for a party
who senses an impending breach.
When Article 2 was finally completed, it included
section 2-609, titled “Right to Adequate Assurance of
Performance.” Official Comment 1 eloquently states the
rationale for and purpose of the doctrine.
The section rests on the recognition of the fact that the essential
purpose of a contract between commercial men is actual performance
and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus
the right to win a lawsuit and that a continuing sense of reliance and
security that the promised performance will be forthcoming when
due, is an important feature of the bargain. If either the willingness
or the ability of a party to perform declines materially between the
time of contracting and the time for performance, the other party is
threatened with the loss of a substantial part of what he has
bargained for. A seller needs protection not merely against having to
deliver on credit to a shaky buyer, but also against having to procure
and manufacture the goods, perhaps turning down other customers.
Once he has been given reason to believe that the buyer’s
performance has become uncertain, it is an undue hardship to force
him to continue his own performance. Similarly, a buyer who
believes that the seller’s deliveries have become uncertain cannot
safely wait for the due date of performance when he has been buying
to assure himself of materials for his current manufacturing or to
replenish his stock of merchandise.29

With this full-throated defense of his innovative scheme to
protect the insecure party, Llewellyn presented to the
American legal community a tool that has proved useful in
managing the risks that often arise when a party appears
unlikely to perform. Let us consider the text of the provision.
Subsection one states,
A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the
other’s expectation of receiving due performance will not be
impaired. If reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to
the performance of either party, the other may demand in a record
adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives the
assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance
for which it has not already received the agreed return.30

The provision comprises several legally significant
components. First, one must establish reasonable grounds for
insecurity.31 Second, if such grounds exist, the Code requires

29
30
31

U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (revised 2003).
Id. § 2-609(1).
Id.
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that a demand for assurances be made in writing.32 Third, the
assurances must be adequate.33 Fourth, the insecure party may
suspend his performance for a commercially reasonable time
until he receives the assurances.34 Finally, if the recipient of the
demand does not provide the assurances within a reasonable
time, the insecure party is entitled to treat this intransigence
as a repudiation.35
Clearly, each of these elements introduces significant
levels of factual and legal uncertainty. What counts as
reasonable grounds for insecurity?36 What assurances are
adequate?37 How is one to formulate a demand so as to put the
promisor on notice of his potential liability under section 2609?38 What counts as a reasonable time for the promisee to
wait to receive assurances?39 The Code’s minimally helpful
response is to inform us that “the reasonableness of grounds for
insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be
determined according to commercial standards.”40
The Official Comments attempt to furnish a somewhat
more textured method for evaluating some of the factual issues
that arise when an insecure party invokes section 2-609. For
example, “a report from an apparently trustworthy source that
the seller had shipped defective goods or was planning to ship
them would normally give the buyer reasonable grounds for
32

Id.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See Smyers v. Quartz Works Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1425 (D. Kan. 1995)
(failure to respond to attempts to communicate); Creusot-Loire Int’l, Inc. v. Coppus
Eng’g Corp., 585 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (reliable information from others who
contract with the promisor that the promisor’s goods are defective).
37
See Smyers, 880 F. Supp. 1425; Creusot-Loire, 585 F. Supp. 45 (demand for
letter of credit and extension of warranty upheld as adequate and not excessive).
38
The language of section 2-609 requires that the demand be in writing,
though many courts have relaxed this requirement. In fact, the courts have often been
extremely flexible about the required form of the demand. See infra Part III. Somewhat
surprisingly, several courts have found that demand has been made and assurances
given where the parties themselves did not realize that they had done so. See Am.
Research Bureau, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 196 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
AMF, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 536 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1976); James J. White,
Eight Cases and Section 251, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 841-42 (1982) (discussing cases
in which assurances were upheld despite the lack of a formal written demand). But see
Cont’l Grain Co. v. McFarland, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 512 (4th Cir. 1980) (demand for
assurances must be in writing).
39
The courts do not appear eager to either extend the thirty-day limit
suggested by the code or require promisors to comply with a demand more promptly
than within thirty days. See, e.g., Smyers, 880 F. Supp. at 1432-33.
40
U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (revised 2003).
33
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insecurity.”41 This bit of guidance is tepid, but mainly
inoffensive. The Comments’ advice for assessing the adequacy
of the assurance, however, verges on risible:
Where the buyer can make use of a defective delivery, a mere
promise by a seller of good repute that he is giving the matter his
attention and that the defect will not be repeated, is normally
sufficient. Under the same circumstances, however, a similar
statement by a known corner-cutter might well be considered
insufficient without the posting of a guaranty or, if so demanded by
the buyer, a speedy replacement of the delivery involved.42

The attempt to distinguish between reputable actors
and known corner-cutters may perhaps appeal to common
sense, and it may comport with Llewellyn’s overall mission of
crafting a law that rings true for “commercial men,”43 yet this
suggestion could not escape the gentle derision of the drafters
of the New York State Law Revision Commission Report on the
UCC.44 The Report noted that “it is doubtful whether courts
would be receptive to an offer of evidence that the opposite
party was a ‘known corner-cutter’ in view of the danger that
this issue might lead to a major digression, with the dangers of
prejudice presented by an exchange of name-calling.”45
The picture that emerges from all of this is of a wellconceived doctrine that addresses a significant problem in a
logical way, but one that is likely to raise challenging factual
issues in litigation, undercutting its effectiveness as a measure
to create certainty and predictability in commercial affairs. In
fact, a large majority of the reported cases on adequate
assurances deal with the issue of whether the promisee in fact
had reasonable grounds for insecurity.46

41

Id. § 2-609 cmt. 3.
Id. § 2-609 cmt. 4.
43
See Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L. REV. 11, 11 (2007).
44
STATE OF N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM’N, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE NO. 65, at 538 (1955).
45
Id.
46
Danzig v. AEC Corp., 224 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (promisor
missing deadlines created grounds for insecurity); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v.
Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 581 (7th Cir. 1976) (reasonable grounds
for insecurity must be based on events occurring after contract negotiations; subjective
fear that obligee will not perform held insufficient); Nat’l Ropes, Inc. v. Nat’l Diving
Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 53, 61 (5th Cir. 1975) (no reasonable grounds for insecurity); La.
Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (E.D. La.
1981) (reasonable grounds for insecurity where seller suggested a disinclination to
perform because of rising costs); Copylease Corp. of Am. v. Memorex Corp., 403 F.
42
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A much smaller group of cases concerns whether the
assurances demanded were adequate or excessive,47 and several
cases address the form of the demand.48 Courts may deny relief
to insecure promisees who have demanded assurances that
exceeded what the court found to be adequate. In Scott v.
Crown, the parties had entered into several contracts for the
purchase and sale of wheat.49 In the course of discussions with
its banker, Scott learned that Crown “was not the best grain
trader” and was advised to look into Crown’s reputation.50 An
agent from the Department of Agriculture informed Scott that
other farmers had complained about Crown’s failure to pay
them.51 Scott acted on this information by demanding
assurances from Crown in the form of immediate payment of
all amounts due (the contracts called for payment within 30
days of delivery).52 The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that
Scott did not, as a matter of law, have the right to suspend its
performance after demanding assurances, because he had
“demanded performance beyond that required by the
contract.”53
Although only one other court has agreed with the Scott
court in condemning assurances that go beyond the original
undertakings of the contract,54 the ruling highlights an
interesting doctrinal conflict inherent in the process of
demanding assurances. However, in their treatise on the
Uniform Commercial Code, White and Summers assert that
the approach the Scott court took is incorrect. As they explain,
“[a]ll demands for adequate assurance call for more than was
originally promised under the contract, and that is precisely
Supp. 625, 630-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (promisor’s statement that contract was not binding
created reasonable grounds for insecurity).
47
See Scott v. Crown, 765 P.2d 1043, 1046-47 (Colo. App. 1988); PittsburghDes Moines Steel Co., 532 F.2d at 572.
48
Nat’l Ropes, 513 F.2d at 60-61 n.9; Auto. Energy Sys., Inc. v. Fibers &
Fabrics of Ga., Inc., 298 S.E.2d 328, 329-30 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Bodine Sewer v. E. Ill.
Precast, Inc., 493 N.E.2d 705, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Teeman v. Jurek, 251 N.W.2d 698,
701 (Minn. 1977). However, in some cases an oral demand for assurances has sufficed.
See Am. Research Bureau, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc. 663 F.2d 189, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Diskmakers, Inc. v. DeWitt Equip. Corp., 555 F.2d 1177, 1180 (3d Cir. 1977).
49
Scott, 765 P.2d at 1044-45.
50
Id. at 1045.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1046-47.
54
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d
572, 581 (7th Cir. 1976) (demand was excessive because it sought more than what was
originally promised under the contract).
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what 2-609 authorizes.”55 Yet one of the definitions of
anticipatory repudiation is a manifestation of unwillingness to
continue to perform except upon conditions that go beyond the
terms of the contract.56 Despite what is probably a doctrinal
error on the part of the Scott court, if an insecure party
demands excessive assurances, he exposes himself to some risk
of committing a repudiation.
When one considers that the bulk of adequate assurance
cases involve disputes over whether a promisee actually had
adequate grounds for insecurity, and that the promisee not
infrequently loses the case on this ground,57 a somewhat
unflattering picture of the doctrine emerges. Recall the original
problem of the promisee who foresees a breach by the promisor:
th
before the middle of the 19 Century, he had no recourse but to
wait until the time for performance passed. With the advent of
anticipatory repudiation, he could treat certain behavior as a
breach, but he risked being deemed the breacher if he guessed
wrong about the law’s eventual interpretation of the promisor’s
actions. Llewellyn’s innovation purported to provide a
procedure to benefit the promisee who did not believe that the
promisor had actually repudiated, but who nonetheless
suffered economically as a result of insecurity.
But if the pre-Article 2 promisee had to cope with risk
and insecurity as a result of his imperfect capacity to
accurately spot a repudiation, the promisee who relies on
section 2-609 must cope with an analogous problem, but at a
slightly different moment. He does not lay his wager upon the
existence of a repudiation, but rather on the reasonableness of
his grounds for insecurity. As one commentator put it in
assessing section 2-609’s effectiveness as a legal innovation,
“section 2-609 sometimes does little more than extend the
minuet between the weaseling party and the contractual
counterpart and add a couple of new moves.”58
Nevertheless, the doctrine has been viewed as enough of
a success that only two decades after the widespread

55

JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-2,
at 199 (5th ed. 2000).
56
See U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 2 (revised 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 250 cmt. b (1981).
57
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
58
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 55, at 197.
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enactment of Article 2 in state legislatures, the American Law
Institute included it in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.59
The Restatement’s version of the doctrine is nearly
identical to section 2-609. One small difference is that the
Restatement does not require the demand to be made in
writing. Section 2-609, on its face, requires a writing, but many
courts have disregarded that requirement.60 Another minor
difference is that where the Uniform Commercial Code defines
both the reasonableness of the grounds for insecurity and the
adequacy of the assurances demanded by commercial
standards, the Restatement does not.61
Having established the general legal outline of the
doctrine, let us now place the law into a factual context.
Sometimes, assurances take a relatively simple form—a mere
affirmation of one’s duties, a promise to actually perform the
obligations undertaken in the contract.62 But sometimes, the
assurances consist of new undertakings. These can take the
form of granting the insecure party the right to inspect the
books of the underperforming party in order to confirm ongoing
solvency.63 Credit terms could be altered to reduce the amount a
buyer may borrow or shorten his time for repayment.64 Or, more
drastically, the insecure party might demand a personal
guaranty from a third party.65 But case law also reveals some
more interesting assurances. A buyer who is behind in
59

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1981).

(1) Where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit a
breach by non-performance that would of itself give the obligee a claim for
damages for total breach under §243, the obligee may demand adequate
assurances of due performance and may, if reasonable, suspend any
performance for which he has not already received the agreed exchange until
he receives such assurance.
(2) The obligee may treat as a repudiation the obligor’s failure to provide
within a reasonable time such assurance of due performance as is adequate
in the circumstances of the particular case.
Id. But this is not to say that the doctrine has escaped serious critique. For an incisive
critique, see Garvin, supra note 5, at 129-40.
60
See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
61
There are a few other differences between the two versions of the doctrine,
none of which are significant for our purposes. For an exegesis of the differences, see
Taylor, supra note 5, at 889-93.
62
U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 4 (revised 2003); see also, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v.
Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (E.D. La. 1981).
63
Int’l Therapeutics, Inc. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 721 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1983).
64
Hornell Brewing Co. v. Spry, 664 N.Y.S.2d 698, 700-01, 703 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
65
Creusot-Loire Int’l, Inc. v. Coppus Eng’g Corp., 585 F. Supp. 45, 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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payments might assign his receivables to the seller.66 A buyer
who is concerned about the quality of the machinery he is
purchasing might ask for an extension or enlargement of his
warranty.67 We could make up some other examples; a seller of
special equipment might make alternative arrangements for
the procurement of higher quality components where the goods
have been defective. But let us take a close look at an actual
recent case in which a promisor provides an assurance that
involves a new undertaking, and we will find that there may be
more to the doctrine than has yet been considered by any court
or theorist.
II.

THE MODERN DOCTRINE

Hornell v. Spry68 appears to be a run of the mill
adequate assurances case, addressing most of the familiar
issues. But a careful reading of the facts reveals an issue that
was not litigated, but that directs our attention to the
promissory character of adequate assurances. Hornell was a
supplier of beverages, including Arizona Iced Tea.69 It entered
into a contract with Steven Spry whereby Spry was to be an
exclusive dealer of Arizona Iced Tea products in Canada.70
Perhaps because Spry had a reputation as a successful
businessman, Hornell was prepared to ship him a large
quantity of product on credit without a written agreement.71
The relationship quickly ran into significant problems, mostly
stemming from the fact that Spry was not paying for the
beverages Hornell was shipping.72 After a series of attempts to
resolve their differences, the parties agreed to a new, more
rigorous financing arrangement, whereby Hornell would
“provide Spry with a $300,000 line of credit, so long as
payments were made on a net 14 day basis.”73 Spry also entered
into an agreement with a factor, whereby Spry would assign
his receivables to the factor who would, in turn, pay Hornell

66

Erwin Weller Co. v. Talon, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 172 (S.D. 1980); Hornell, 664
N.Y.S.2d at 698.
67
Creusot-Loire, 585 F. Supp. 45.
68
Hornell, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
69
Id. at 699.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 699-700.
72
Id. at 700.
73
Id.
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the amounts due on Spry’s account.74 Hornell resumed shipping
iced tea to Spry on these terms, but despite the fact that Spry
made his first payment on time, Hornell learned that “Spry’s
warehouse was empty, that he had no managerial, sales or
office staff, that he had no trucks, and that in effect his whole
operation was a sham.”75
As a result of this disturbing news, on May 10, 1994,
Hornell wrote a letter to Spry stating,
[B]efore we release any more product, we are asking you to provide
us with a letter confirming the existence of your line of credit as well
as a personal guarantee that is backed up with a personal financial
statement that can be verified. Another option would be for you to
provide us with an irrevocable letter of credit in the amount of
$300,000.76

Spry did not respond to this letter and, after a few months of
negotiations, Hornell sued Spry, seeking a declaratory
judgment that Spry had no further rights under the contract.77
In ruling for Hornell, the court noted that while both parties
maintained that there had been only one demand for adequate
assurances (the alteration of credit terms to cap advances at
$300,000 and demand that payment be made in full within
fourteen days), in fact Hornell had made two separate demands
for adequate assurances.78
The court agreed that Spry’s initial failure to make
timely payments gave Hornell reasonable grounds for
insecurity and ruled that Hornell’s initiation of tighter credit
terms was a reasonable demand for assurances.79 These
assurances were given and put the relationship on proper legal
footing.80 But the court explained that when Hornell learned
that Spry had been accepting shipments of product without
having established any appropriate business operations,
Hornell had renewed grounds for insecurity.81 Thus, the May 10
letter constituted another appropriate demand for adequate
assurances.82 Spry’s failure to respond to this demand
74

Id. at 700. Neither of these new commitments was made pursuant to a
formal written demand for assurances under section 2-609. Id. at 700, 702.
75
Id. at 701.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 699, 701.
78
Id. at 701-03.
79
Id. at 703.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 703-04.
82
Id.
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amounted to a “repudiation of the distributorship agreement,
which entitled plaintiff to suspend performance and terminate
the agreement.”83
Putting aside the question of what Spry wanted with all
that iced tea if he wasn’t going to sell it, the case raises a series
of issues common to the adequate assurances cases. Did the
first attempt to restrain Spry’s actions with the imposition of
tighter credit terms amount to a demand for assurances? Were
Hornell’s second grounds for insecurity reasonable in view of
the fact that Spry had paid his balance in full within fourteen
days, in accordance with the initial demand for assurances?
Were the assurances demanded in the May 10 letter excessive?
None of these questions caused much difficulty for the
Hornell court, though it did hint that there was some doubt as
to whether Hornell’s second demand was excessive.84 Yet there
is another question lurking in this case, a question that courts
have yet to address. When Hornell initially found that Spry
was delinquent in its payments, it demanded that Spry agree
to new credit terms in order to assuage its insecurity.85 In
giving these assurances, Spry made a promise. The question
that neither the Hornell court, nor any other court, seems to
have explicitly confronted is, how long should this new
arrangement endure? Is it to last the lifetime of the contract?
Should it persist only until Spry establishes a record of timely
payment? Or should Spry be required to comply with the
promise of the assurances until Hornell has been made whole?
The first option suggests that the assurances amount to a
modification of the contract. The second, which is probably
what the Hornell court would have chosen, would more closely
tie the assurance to the insecurity—when the promisee is no
longer insecure, the assurance is no longer needed.86 The last
option would indicate that the assurance represents an
independent promise in the nature of a separate contract.
Reflecting upon these questions forces one to consider
the promissory character of adequate assurances. What are we
to make of this promise? Is it a modification of the original

83

Id. at 704.
Id. (noting that the question of reasonableness of demands for assurances
was “a close one”).
85
Id. at 700.
86
See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
84
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contract or could it be viewed as an independent promise?87
This article will focus on the latter possibility. When one
focuses on the promissory character of the assurance in this
manner, one must confront several questions. Is the promise
enforceable as a contract?88 How long is it to endure?89 What are
the consequences if it is breached, and can its breach give rise
to damages independent of the original contract?90 This last
question takes on particular importance when one considers
the possibility that the original contract might include some
limitations on damages, such as a stipulated damages clause,
an exclusion of consequential damages, or a clause limiting
damages to repair or replacement. The remainder of this article
will address these questions.
III.

ADEQUATE ASSURANCES OFTEN COMPRISE PROMISES
THAT SHOULD BE TREATED AS CONTRACTS

This section will, from a doctrinal perspective, examine
whether promises made in response to a demand for adequate
assurances meet the basic requirements of a contract.
Specifically, this Part will consider contract law’s traditional
bases of enforcement as well as a relevant ground to deny
enforcement—duress.
A.

Enforceable Promises

A logical place to begin this inquiry is with the
definition of a contract. A contract is unhelpfully defined in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts as “a promise or set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy.”91 Of
course, not all promises are enforced as contracts; the simplest
way to describe the current state of American contract law is to
say that there are two primary categories of promises that
courts enforce: those that are given for consideration, and those
on which the promisee detrimentally relies.92 In this article, I
87

Here I wish to clarify my terminology. By using the term “independent
promise,” I do not wish to reference the vocabulary of conditions. Rather, I simply
mean that the promise of the assurance could form the basis of a separate contract.
88
See infra Part III.
89
See infra Part IV.
90
See infra Part V.
91
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
92
There are, of course, other categories of enforceable promises. For example,
promises under seal and promises to modify a contract under section 2-209 of the
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will ask whether various types of assurances satisfy one or the
other of these two criteria for enforceability, but I will treat an
affirmative answer to that question as a necessary—but not a
sufficient—condition for treating such an assurance as a
contract. Even if an assurance-promise is enforceable because
it is given for consideration, or is relied on, it may only be
enforceable as a modification of the original contract, not as a
separate contract.93
As a preliminary matter, let us first dispose of the
weakest form of assurance contemplated by section 2-609: the
mere affirmation of one’s intention to perform his obligations
under the contract.94 While this sort of assurance could possibly
be construed as a promise, it is not the sort of promise that this
article seeks to address.95 Instead, as we embark on our inquiry
into whether an assurance might involve an enforceable
promise, we will focus on more robust, sturdy promises, such as
the one to furnish a personal guaranty.
Is such an assurance an enforceable promise? On one
level, the question of enforcement can be answered
preliminarily in a rather straightforward manner: yes, it’s
enforceable. Why? By operation of positive law—section 2-609.
But this facile answer skirts a fundamental underlying
question: what does it mean to enforce a promise? Typically,
contract law enforces promises by providing a remedy for their
breach, and the remedy is typically money damages meant to
put the promisee in the position he would have occupied had
the promisor performed.96 But in saying that section 2-609
makes the promise enforceable, we are only saying that section
2-609 provides its own regime of enforcement. The promise is,
by the terms of the statutory provision, enforced with the
remedy of accelerating breach, i.e., the insecure party may
treat the principal contract as repudiated. Yet this proposition
is, in fact, inaccurate. Section 2-609 is silent on enforcement of
the promise, and merely creates a duty to make a certain kind
Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-209 (revised 2003); JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN
D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 274-78 (5th ed. 2003).
93
I will take up this line of inquiry in the epilogue, infra.
94
Assurances of this sort are rather common in the case law. See, e.g.,
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bressler, 977 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1992); Gutor Int’l AG v.
Raymond Packer Co., 493 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1992).
95
This is not to say that this sort of assurance is entirely devoid of theoretical
significance. Those who would take a strong position on the illegitimacy of assurances
would even consider the mere affirmation of intention to perform to be more security
than that to which the promisee is entitled. See Garvin, supra note 5, at 130-38.
96
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(1) (1981).
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of promise and punishes the failure to make that promise,
under certain circumstances. Further, it is silent on the
question of what happens when a party furnishes assurances
but does not live up to them.97 Thus my central question: is the
promise enforceable in its own right, outside of the context and
framework of section 2-609?
The promise might be enforceable for the same kinds of
reasons we enforce other promises; namely, it might have been
given for consideration, or detrimentally relied upon by the
promisee. Let us begin by asking whether there is
consideration for the promise. According to Holmes,
consideration involves not just a benefit to the promisor and a
detriment to the promisee, but also a relationship of “reciprocal
conventional inducement.”98 The “promise must induce the
detriment and the detriment must induce the promise.”99 In our
example, the buyer promised to furnish a personal guaranty of
monies owed. Was that promise bargained for? Did the buyer
receive a benefit, or did the seller suffer a detriment? In order
to answer these questions, a bit of factual context will be
helpful. Imagine the following conversation between a seller
and a buyer:
S: Look, I’ve heard that you have not been paying your other
creditors for quite some time. Even though you have finally paid
your balance, many of your recent payments have been late. I’m very
concerned.
B: I know. Cash has been a little tight, but things have already
picked up since the beginning of the new quarter. I’m pretty sure
that by the end of the year, I’ll be back to paying off my full balance
early, as I have done in years past.
S: I don’t think that’s going to cut it. I’ve got plenty of other
customers I can sell to. I don’t want to stop doing business with you,
but without a personal guaranty, I’ve got no other choice.

97

One case has hinted at an answer to this question. See Am. Research
Bureau, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 196 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Professor
White has pointed out that a careful reading of a footnote in ARB reveals the court’s
belief that “it was the failure to comply with the assurances that gave the right to
cancel,” not the failure to give assurances. White, supra note 5, at 846. This
interpretation of the law stands in contrast with the standard reading of the statute
that says that if assurances are given, the insecure party must continue to perform.
98
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 227-30 (Howe ed., 1963)
(1881).
99
Id.
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B: A personal guaranty? Wow, that’s a pretty big step. You know, my
company has been around for a long time. We’re in no real danger of
insolvency. Why don’t you just give me until the end of the year?
S: I’m sorry, but without a personal guaranty, I’m going to have to
stop sending you product.
B: Okay. I’ll give you the guaranty.100

The existence of consideration is invariably a factsensitive inquiry. Depending on the factual assumptions we
make, it may be somewhat difficult to argue there is
consideration for this promise, at least under the bargain
theory of consideration. Perhaps the consideration is rooted in
the seller’s forbearing from suspending his performance. But
for that to be a detriment (or a benefit to the buyer), we would
have to conclude that the seller had a legal right to do so.
Under section 2-609, however, this right does not arise until
there has been an actual breach or a breach by anticipatory
repudiation (including a repudiation resulting from the
promisee’s failure to respond to the demand for adequate
assurances).101 Thus, while it seems as though there might be a
100

Some readers might observe that if the seller had the right to stop
delivering product, then the buyer must be in breach. This being the case, why doesn’t
the seller simply sue? If this is not the case, then the seller would be in breach by not
delivering. This observation, while logical on its face, is something of a misconception.
While it is true that there are many cases in which a promisor’s failure to perform will
amount to a breach with a clear legal consequence, those are not the kinds of disputes
in which adequate assurance doctrine is invoked. As Larry Garvin explains in his
excellent article on adequate assurances:
Relational contract is pertinent because the sort of contract under which
adequate assurance is invoked almost always is relational. By definition,
neither party has performed in full, which removes at a stroke almost all
cash sales or ordinary credit sales where the goods are picked up on the spot.
Rather, the usual sort of deal in these cases is a construction contract, or a
long-term supply agreement, or a contract to manufacture specially-designed
goods for some extended period—all potentially relational. In addition,
adequate assurance normally comes about in part because the parties failed
to define default in detail or otherwise provide expressly for allocating risks
of the type that came about. In other words, the contracts are incomplete.
Garvin, supra note 5, at 117.
101
U.C.C. § 2-609(4) (revised 2003); see also Garvin, supra note 5, at 115-20.
The facts of Hornell v. Spry, 664 N.Y.S. 2d 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997), fall neatly into one
of Garvin’s categories of typical assurances cases. The parties had a long-term supply
contract that was never memorialized in a writing and thus devoid of any provisions
defining default. What the court characterized as the parties’ first round of assurances
was their attempt to provide the types of terms that might have governed their
agreement in the first instance. If those terms had been agreed upon, Hornell would
not have had to resort to a demand for assurances. Rather, it could have sued Spry for
breach, assuming his conduct (which was not well explained in the opinion) violated his
credit terms.
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detriment to the promisee, careful analysis reveals that the
insecure party didn’t have a right to suspend his performance
at the moment the promisee gave the assurance. The time for
performance had not yet passed and there had not been an
unequivocal repudiation. Until the demand is rejected, or the
assurances not given, there is no such right. So it would be
circular to conclude that continuing to perform constitutes
consideration, for it is only the refusal to give assurances that
gives rise to the right to treat the promisor as in breach.102
Maybe consideration can be found elsewhere.
Consideration doctrine is famously malleable, and courts are
usually able to find consideration for a promise whenever they
are inclined to do so.103 Occasionally, this means reverting to the
more easily satisfied test of Hamer v. Sidway,104 which requires
only a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee,
but does not require the element of inducement.105 Moreover, a
well-counseled promisee would grant a concession in exchange
for the assurance.106 Perhaps, as with modifications under the
common law, a horse, hawk, or robe would suffice.107 Thus we

102

Even if this were legal detriment, it would be hard to argue that this
detriment induced the promise to provide the guaranty. Rather, one imagines that the
buyer gave the guaranty in order to ensure that the seller will continue to deliver
product. In this we can begin to see the outlines of a claim of a modification made
under duress. We shall pursue this idea shortly.
103
See, e.g., Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cnty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173
(N.Y. 1927) (finding consideration for a promise to donate to a college in the fact that
the college, by accepting the pledge, had made an implied promise to create a named
scholarship to memorialize the pledge); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214
(N.Y. 1917) (finding consideration in an implied promise to use best efforts to sell
defendant’s fashions pursuant to an exclusive distribution agreement); DeCicco v.
Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917). In his classic book, The Death of Contract, Grant
Gilmore pointed out that in DeCicco, Chief Judge Cardozo found “consideration for a
father’s promise to pay his engaged daughter an annuity after marriage in the fact that
the engaged couple, instead of breaking off the engagement, had in fact married.”
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 69 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., Ohio State
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1974).
104
27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
105
Farnsworth asserts that “Hamer is still very much alive, along with the
notion that either a benefit or a detriment will suffice.” FARNSWORTH, supra note 2,
§ 2.4, at 52 n.9; see also Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1982)
(“[A]ny basic contemporary definition would include the idea that [consideration]
consists of either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee . . . [a]s
elaborated in Hamer v. Sidway, the seminal case on the subject.”).
106
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 4.23, at 295-98.
107
This is the famous dictum of Lord Coke, explaining what new
consideration could be offered to make a modification enforceable in the face of the preexisting duty rule. To supplement his quaint locution with something more appropriate
to a commercial setting, Coke suggested that accepting payment at a different location
than originally agreed to would be sufficient consideration to make enforceable a
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might say that the consideration is the insecure party’s implied
promise not to suspend its performance. But can a tacit
promise induce a return promise?
In some cases, however, consideration might be easier to
find. For example, we might very plausibly assume that in our
hypothetical, the contract included a term permitting the seller
to cancel if the buyer is late in his payments. With this new
fact, we can say with confidence that the seller’s willingness to
stay in the contract—to waive his right to cancel—would be a
bargained-for detriment, and would thus constitute
consideration.
Depending on the facts of the particular case, then,
there may not be any consideration for the promise of the
assurance. But that does not mean that the assurances cannot
comprise an enforceable promise; assuming the non-existence
of consideration simply moves us along to another branch of
our analysis.
Contract law has another significant justification for the
enforcement of promises in the absence of consideration:
reliance, i.e., the doctrine known as promissory estoppel.108
Promissory estoppel, though not without its detractors,109 has
been firmly established in American contract law for nearly a
century.110 While there is some dispute at the theoretical level
over whether promissory estoppel is properly understood as
being rooted in promise or in the harm caused by one’s
utterances, the legal requirements for the invocation of the
doctrine are relatively clear. Under section 90 of the Second
Restatement, “[a] promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of
the promisee or a third person and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.”111
Promissory estoppel should provide a basis for enforcing
assurance-promises in many cases. For our present purposes,
let us take the example discussed above of the buyer who
promises to furnish a personal guaranty. The seller relies on

modification lowering the price. Pinnel’s Case, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (Q.B.); 5 Co.
Rep. 117a, 117b.
108
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
109
See GILMORE, supra note 103, at 71.
110
See Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents: I, 50
MICH. L. REV. 639, 639-40 (1952) (explaining the development of promissory estoppel).
111
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
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this promise by continuing to deliver goods on credit, just as
the promisor expects. If a court were to find that there is no
consideration for this promise (for the sorts of reasons we
discussed above), could the seller avoid making good on the
guaranty? It seems quite clear that injustice would be the
result if the court refused to enforce the promise. The results in
cases involving claims of promissory estoppel are invariably
fact-sensitive, but this generic example should suffice to
establish a basis for recognizing that adequate assurances, in
particular cases, can take the form of enforceable promises.
But what if there is neither consideration nor actionable
reliance? In such cases, we might argue that the promise is
nevertheless enforceable by operation of statutory law—section
2-609. There are other examples in contract law of promises
being made enforceable by virtue of a statute even in the
absence of consideration.112 For example, under section 2-209 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, a promise to modify a contract
is enforceable despite the absence of consideration.113 So maybe
there is consideration and maybe there’s no consideration, but
the promise is enforceable nonetheless.
The presence of consideration, in conclusion, will be a
questionable proposition in many cases. There may be good
reasons to believe that the promise of the guaranty in our
hypothetical was not given for consideration, but, given the
right facts, there will be at least a colorable argument to be
made to the contrary. If one concludes that there really can be
no consideration for such a promise, then one must either
conclude that absent detrimental reliance, there is no basis for
enforcement or that enforcement is a possibility solely on the
basis of the statutory scheme of section 2-609. Alternatively,
one might take the position that the determination of whether
consideration exists must be taken up on a case-by-case basis,
and that in those cases where consideration is found, the
promise of the assurance may form the basis of a contract.
Given the instability of grounding enforcement on
consideration, it seems that the most promising basis for
granting legal enforcement to the assurance promise would be
that the promisee had relied on it to his detriment. In any
event, it is not necessary for our analysis to be able to say
112

A Pennsylvania statute provides that a promise in writing may be
enforceable even in the absence of consideration so long as the writing expresses the
promisor’s intention to be legally bound. 33 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6 (West 2008).
113
U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (revised 2003).
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categorically that all promises made when giving assurances
are enforceable as contracts. It is enough to conclude that such
treatment is possible, given the right facts. Moreover, the
“right facts” exist outside of jerry-rigged hypotheticals; they
appear commonly in real cases, like Hornell, the Arizona Iced
Tea case.
Whether or not a promise can be said to be supported by
consideration or enforceable because of reliance, such indicia of
enforceability are merely necessary conditions, not sufficient
ones. Even a promise that has been detrimentally relied on
may not be enforceable if it was not freely given.114 One of the
foundational principles in contract law is consent; the law is
careful not to impose contractual liability on persons who were
in some sense coerced into entering a contract.
B.

Duress and Impaired Volition

On a conceptual level, a demand for adequate
assurances involves duress. An assurance pursuant to section
2-609 is not really a promise freely given. The giver of the
assurance does so not of his own volition, but rather because he
is being threatened with legal sanction for failing to give it.
This is an argument that at least one court has weighed in on.
In Erwin Weller Co. v. Talon Inc., a buyer was having difficulty
meeting his payment obligations to his seller.115 The parties
amended their agreement to provide the buyer “an extended
period to make payments due or coming due . . . and granted
[the seller] a security interest in the [buyer’s] accounts
receivable . . . .”116 The buyer argued that the amended
agreement “did not constitute a valid contract because [he]
signed it under duress.”117 The Supreme Court of North Dakota
rejected this argument, stating that the promisee’s demand
could not amount to duress because the insecure seller had a
statutory right to the assurances.118
So duress is an issue that theoretically could be
marshaled as an argument against calling adequate assurances
contracts, but doctrinally, it seems dubious. The legal
114

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981) (“If a party’s
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves
the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”).
115
295 N.W.2d 172, 173 (S.D. 1980).
116
Id.
117
Id. at 174.
118
Id.

192

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

requirements for duress can be rather formidable119 and don’t
seem to be present in the kinds of promises we’re talking about
here. But this is not to say that a promisor could never
successfully assert duress as a defense to liability for failing to
live up to his assurances. When policing contractual
modifications, contract law relaxes the more stringent legal
requirements for duress that are imposed when duress is
asserted as a defense to formation of an original contract.120
David Snyder has argued that in the modification context,
courts ought to, and in fact do, consider a lower standard of
“coercion.”121
Despite the doctrinal obstacles to characterizing a
demand for adequate assurances as duress, Larry Garvin has
argued forcefully that section 2-609 does, in fact, endorse
duress.122 Describing a demand for assurances as “an offer that
the promisor can’t refuse,” Garvin explains:
One party to an agreement is placed in an awkward position; either
it consents to an unwanted modification or it is held in breach and
forced to pay damages. Though there is a choice here, it is most
unpalatable, for the promisor cannot choose simply to go ahead with
the contract originally agreed upon. Either way, the promisor will
incur new liabilities, whether under the modified contract or under
the breached contract. . . . That there is a choice does not eliminate
duress; whether the choice was coerced is the real question.123

119

Duress traditionally required proof of physical compulsion or a threat
thereof. The law has evolved to allow simply an “improper threat” to serve as the
evidentiary basis as it moved away from recognizing only physical duress to economic
duress and undue influence. In any event, most courts require some sort of threat. In
addition, courts commonly require that the duress “resulted from defendant’s wrongful
and oppressive conduct and not by plaintiff’s necessities.” W. R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil
C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896, 904 (8th Cir. 1957); see also Selmer Co. v. BlakesleeMidwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring a party claiming duress to
show that its financial difficulties had been caused by the other party). So long as a
promisee in fact had reasonable grounds for insecurity, it would be difficult to maintain
that a demand for adequate assurances pursuant to section 2-609 could amount to
wrongful and oppressive conduct.
120
Under section 89(a) of the Second Restatement, a modification is enforceable
so long as it is “fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties
when the contract was made.” Thus attempts to avoid coerced modifications can succeed
if they can be shown to be inequitable, irrespective of threats, or whether or not the
complaining party’s difficulties were caused by the party seeking enforcement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (1981).
121
David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: Public
and Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WIS. L. REV.
607, 684.
122
Garvin, supra note 5, at 71, 135.
123
Id. at 135-36.
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While duress may have some potential to limit the
ability of an insecure party to extract additional undertakings
from his counterpart, curiously, it also has the potential to
afflict the insecure party as well. It is possible that the party
giving the assurance is not the only one who may be under
duress, not the only party with a somewhat impaired volition
as relates to this supposed new contract arising out of the
assurance. In several cases, courts have found that a demand
was made and assurances were given, even though the parties
didn’t realize that they had done so.124 They were engaging in
the normal negotiating activity of working out their troubled
deal, trying to come to some accommodation. When they could
not and eventually ended up in litigation, the court said that
their efforts to reach an understanding amounted to
assurances demanded and given.125 For example, in AMF, Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., AMF had agreed in 1968 to furnish
McDonald’s with a technologically innovative computerized
cash register and twenty-three production models.126 Plagued by
technical problems, AMF struggled to produce the machines
according to schedule.127 After several accommodations,
McDonald’s asked AMF to suspend the production of the
twenty-three units.128 AMF agreed, but ultimately sued
McDonald’s for breach.129 The court ruled that McDonald’s had
a right to cancel the contract pursuant to section 2-609.130
While this sketch of the facts of AMF suggests the
normal application of 2-609, there is something rather curious
about the court’s ruling. McDonald’s never made a formal
written demand for adequate assurances. Indeed, the reported
facts of the case do not suggest that McDonald’s even made a
formal oral demand. Thus it appears that the court fashioned a
2-609 demand out of the parties’ routine attempts to work out
their troubled contract.131
So it is possible not only to be coerced by the insecure
party into giving assurances, but also for the insecure party to
receive assurances without him knowing it. The cases provide
124

Smyers v. Quartz Works Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1425, 1433 (D. Kan. 1995)
(demand for payment should be construed as a demand for assurances).
125
Id.
126
536 F.2d 1167, 1168 (7th Cir. 1976).
127
Id. at 1169.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1171.
131
See White, supra note 5, at 857-58.
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another way that adequate assurances can be less than fully
consensual. In these cases, demand for assurances is ruled to
be a compulsory prerequisite to canceling the contract.132 For
example, in National Farmers Organization v. Bartlett & Co.,
Grain, the parties entered into multiple contracts whereby
NFO was to deliver specified amounts of grain to Bartlett.133 At
some point, Bartlett began withholding payment “as protection
against realized or potential loss caused by failure on the
Seller’s part to perform all contracts not yet fully performed.”134
NFO informed Bartlett on January 26, 1973 that it would not
perform the remaining contracts until Bartlett paid a
significant portion of the amounts due for grain already
delivered.135 NFO never delivered any grain under the
remaining contracts and Bartlett ultimately withheld some
$18,000.136
In its suit to recover the $18,000, NFO argued that
Bartlett’s failure to pay in response to the statement was a
repudiation.137 The court, however, ruled that NFO’s statement
of January 26 was a repudiation.138 Although the court could
have followed the example of the AMF court, finding the
January 26 statement to be a demand for adequate assurances
it declined to do so, stating, “[p]lainly, the seller could have
availed itself of a section 2-609 remedy on January 26. Equally
plainly, however, it did not do so.”139
In Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., the court
took a similar position. Advance was to buy 1000 tons of
European steel in three installments from Harlow.140 After
accepting the first two shipments, the buyer expressed concern
about the timeliness of the final delivery.141 The contract called
for the steel to arrive by “September-October shipment,”
though there was evidence of a trade usage indicating that this
term contemplated that delivery by November 30 would be

132

But see GFSI, Inc. v. J-Loong Trading, Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 935, 947 (D.
Kan. 2007) (no written demand thus no protection of section 2-609).
133
560 F.2d 1350, 1352 (8th Cir. 1977).
134
Id. at 1353.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 1354.
137
Id. at 1356.
138
Id. at 1358.
139
Id. at 1355.
140
424 F. Supp. 770, 772 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
141
Id. at 773.
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acceptable.142 On October 29, Advance sent a letter notifying
Harlow of its intention to reject the final shipment because of
late delivery.143 The steel arrived in mid-November.144
In ruling that Advance’s rejection of the shipment
amounted to a repudiation, the court asserted that “[h]ad
Advance taken the course prescribed by sec. 2-609, Harlow
would have had the opportunity to effect a timely delivery and
so cure any delay in shipment. In light of this available
remedy, Advance’s outright rejection of the contract on October
29 . . . was unjustified.”145
Under cases like NFO and Harlow, an insecure party
appears not to have the option of treating defective
performance as a breach or repudiation until he has asked for
adequate assurances. Thus we might view the situation as one
in which the insecure promisee can be seen as making a
coerced demand for assurances and the underperforming
promisor making a coerced promise.
But even if one accepts this reading of these cases, it is
important not to overstate their significance. For it would be
revolutionary indeed to claim that all obligees must pass
through section 2-609 (or section 251) on their way to treating
an obligor’s delinquency as a breach entitling them to suspend
performance. This is not the law, for if it were, it would render
the doctrine of present breach by anticipatory repudiation
meaningless.146 Rather, the broadly accepted view is the one
propounded by the Restatement, that where a promisor has
committed a total breach, the promisee is entitled to suspend
performance and sue for damages.147 Nevertheless, in all of this,
we can see that there are significant issues of consensuality
that might affect our view of the promissory character of
adequate assurances. But the doctrines of consent and duress
will not serve as a total bar to enforcement.
This Part has shown that there is a substantial
doctrinal basis for the claim that a promise made in response to
a demand for adequate assurances could be treated in law as
an enforceable contract. Although there is some theoretical
142

Id.
Id. at 776.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 778.
146
But see Hillman, supra note 5, at 559 (arguing that making recourse to § 2609 a mandatory predicate to cancelling a contract would best serve the purposes of
Article 2).
147
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 237, 242 (1981).
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basis for questioning the consensual nature of such a promise,
no court has taken such a duress argument seriously. In Parts
IV and V, we will consider the consequences of treating the
assurance-promise as a distinct contract.
IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF TREATING ASSURANCES AS
ENFORCEABLE PROMISES—DURATION

If we are to treat assurances as a distinct promise
comprising an enforceable contract, we must address the
ramifications of such a classification. One particularly
significant consequence would be the effect on remedies, a topic
we explore below in Part V. A related question relates to the
duration or life span of the assurance: How long must the
promisor continue to perform the undertakings of the
assurances? Should the promises contained in the assurances
continue to bind the promisor even after the original contract
has come to an end, whether it has been breached, cancelled, or
otherwise terminated? If the assurance amounts to an
enforceable contract, then it stands to reason that the duration
of the promisor’s obligation to perform should not necessarily
be yoked to the duration of the original contract. We might ask
whether, in a case like Hornell148 (the Arizona Iced Tea case), a
party in Spry’s position would have been bound to continue
performing in accordance with his assurances for the life of the
contract and beyond, had the parties continued in their
contractual relationship after agreeing to more restrictive
terms. Or would he be entitled to enjoy the parties’ original
financing arrangement once he had established a track record
of responsible behavior, thus putting an end to Hornell’s
grounds for insecurity?
To begin to answer these vexing questions of duration,
let us return to the example of the personal guaranty given in
response to a demand for adequate assurances. It is not
controversial to say that a guaranty often endures beyond the
lifespan of the original contract. Indeed, on some level, the
guaranty doesn’t really even spring to life until the original
contract has come to an end (at least from the unpaid obligee’s
perspective).149 To be sure, a guaranty serves an important role
148

Hornell v. Spry, 664 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
In the terminology of the Third Restatement of Suretyship and Guaranty,
the contract of guaranty involves three parties: a creditor who is owed a duty, termed the
obligee; a debtor who owes the duty, the primary obligor; and a guarantor or surety who
149
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from the moment it is given, for it gives the obligee the security
to continue performing; indeed this is one of its primary raisons
d’etre.150 But on the other hand, a guaranty is in some sense
dormant until the primary obligor defaults on his obligation. It
is at that moment that the guaranty fully actualizes. Often,
though not in all cases, this moment will roughly coincide with
the underlying contract coming to an end, whether through
breach, termination or cancellation. Thus, in many instances, a
guaranty will outlive the contractual relationship from which it
arose. On this basis, we can assert that in some cases, the
promise of an assurance can endure beyond the life of the
original contract, and be seen as a distinct contract.
But the question of duration is not always so clear.
Consider the example of the assignment of receivables. The
buyer buys on credit from the seller and is falling behind in his
payments. Ultimately, in response to a demand for adequate
assurances, the buyer agrees to assign his receivables to the
seller. For a while, both parties find this plan agreeable; the
seller is getting his money and the buyer is willing to assign
the receivables as long as he is getting the goods. Imagine,
however, that after some period of time, the buyer realizes that
he no longer wants to continue in this arrangement, though he
is still in arrears. Under these circumstances, with the seller
still insecure about getting paid both for amounts past due and
those due on shipments he continues to make, it makes sense
to support a rule requiring that the assignment must persist.
But what if the contract terminates while the buyer is
still in arrears? This scenario presents us with a different and
more interesting question. Assume that the buyer terminates
the principal purchase agreement in accordance with the
contract’s termination provisions, and wants his cash flow
back. Does the assignment live on beyond the life span of the
contract, or must the seller resort to legal process in order to
get paid? The seller would like to continue with the assignment
as a sort of self-help remedy, and the buyer wishes he had
never made the promise. Does the assignment arrangement
continue on for some duration, such as until the contract
payments are all made? Or is it a sort of appendage to the
principal contract, relying on that contract for its heartbeat
promises to perform, or pay damages on the primary obligor’s behalf, the secondary
obligor. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 1 (1996).
150
See Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guarantee Contract,
66. U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1999).
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and blood supply? Is the answer any different if the contract
comes to an end because of an unrelated breach, for example, if
the buyer fails to place minimum orders. What if the seller
breaches?
Although the case law provides precious little guidance
in choosing between these two approaches to the duration
question, one exception can be found in Hornell. Recall that in
Hornell, Spry, the buyer, agreed to tighter credit terms in
response to Hornell’s initial demand for adequate assurances.151
These included capping any outstanding credit at $300,000 and
requiring Spry to repay all amounts loaned with fourteen
days.152 Shortly after the parties reached this agreement, Spry
arranged to have his balance paid in full, but proceeded
immediately to place an order for somewhere between $390,000
and $450,000.153 Hornell refused to fill this order without
further assurances, including a personal guaranty.154 The court
noted that Spry’s order not only exceeded the agreed limit, but
also “placed Hornell in a position where it would have no
opportunity to learn whether Spry would meet the 14-day
payment terms, before Spry again became indebted to Hornell
for a very large sum of money.”155 The court further stated that
the “arrangement, by its terms, clearly contemplated an
opportunity for Hornell to test out defendants’ ability to make
payment with 14-day periods.”156
Although the facts of Hornell do not mesh perfectly with
those of the hypothetical, the court’s comments can be read to
suggest a flexible approach to duration aimed at making
certain that the assurance lasts as long as needed to assuage
the insecurity. They also suggest that the assurance is
intended to protect the insecure party against further loss.
These dicta from Hornell thus shed some light on our question
about duration. Yet, to arrive at a more satisfying answer, we
must look beyond the case law to the Official Comments to
section 2-609, which articulate the purposes of the doctrine.

151
152
153
154
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Hornell, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
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Id. at 703 (emphasis omitted).
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The Purposes that Animate the Doctrine of Adequate
Assurances

Further insight into the question of duration may be
found in a careful examination of the purposes of adequate
assurances, as conceived by Llewellyn and the other drafters of
Article 2. Their view, broadly stated, is that assurances are
given to ensure that the insecure party might continue
performing free from insecurity. Let us once again take a look
at the Official Comment to section 2-609, which states:
The section rests on the recognition of the fact that the essential
purpose of a contract between commercial men is actual performance
and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus
the right to win a lawsuit and that a continuing sense of reliance and
security that the promised performance will be forthcoming when
due, is an important feature of the bargain. If either the willingness
or the ability of a party to perform declines materially between the
time of contracting and the time for performance, the other party is
threatened with the loss of a substantial part of what he has
bargained for. A seller needs protection not merely against having to
deliver on credit to a shaky buyer, but also against having to procure
and manufacture the goods, perhaps turning down other customers.
Once he has been given reason to believe that the buyer’s performance
has become uncertain, it is an undue hardship to force him to
continue his own performance. Similarly, a buyer who believes that
the seller’s deliveries have become uncertain cannot safely wait for the
due date of performance when he has been buying to assure himself of
materials for his current manufacturing or to replenish his stock of
merchandise.157

A close reading of this paragraph reveals several
rationales for the doctrine. Taken roughly in the order
presented, the first appears to be an affirmation of the
expectation interest. In saying that “commercial men . . . do not
bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the right to
win a lawsuit,”158 the Comment appears to view a principal
purpose of section 2-609 as being to ensure that the promisee
receives what he has been promised without resorting to
judicial process. The Comment can also be read as expressing a
concern for the psychological state of the insecure party. There
is disutility in fearing that the promisor will not perform and
assurances go some way to assuage that fear. Next, the
Comment suggests a desire to minimize the insecure
promisee’s potential reliance loss or opportunity cost that may
157
158

U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (revised 2003) (emphasis added).
Id.
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result from staying in a contract with a shaky or flaky
counterpart. If the promisor is unwilling to give the
assurances, the insecure party can cut its loss by refusing to
manufacture or deliver goods to the promisor or by arranging
to sell them elsewhere.159 A fourth rationale, expressed in terms
of the “undue hardship” to the promisee who must “continue
his own performance” when the promisor’s “performance has
become uncertain,” can be characterized as a concern for
holding the deal together. The implication is that if the
assurances are given, the promisee is relieved of an undue
hardship and will be more likely to continue in the contractual
relationship. While the Official Comment does not explicitly
state this as a value, commentators have recognized this
purpose of the doctrine160 and it comports with one of
Llewellyn’s overarching purposes in shaping Article 2.161
Other purposes, also not suggested by the text of the
Comment, are served by the doctrine. Among these are:
fostering communication between the parties,162 encouraging
dispute resolution outside of the courts,163 and serving as a selfhelp enforcement mechanism.164 I will discuss these purposes in
turn, considering whether they offer any support for the view
that assurance promises ought to be enforced even after the
underlying contract ceases to be in effect.
B.

Are the Purposes of the Doctrine Furthered by Enforcing
Assurance Promises After the Underlying Contract Has
Been Terminated?

If we view adequate assurances as being primarily
concerned with holding the deal together, then it hardly makes
sense to require the promisor to continue in the assignment of
159

If the promisor gives the assurances, then either he will make good on the
contract (the increased probability of which he has signaled by giving the assurance),
or he will breach. If he breaches, then the promisee’s reliance loss in a given case may
not have been reduced by the assurances (though he still might have acted to minimize
his reliance despite the assurances), but the ex ante reliance loss has decreased as a
result of the use of section 2-609.
160
See Garvin, supra note 5, at 124-27; Taylor, supra note 5, at 883-85.
161
See Richard A. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 621 (1975); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The
Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The
Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1149 (1985).
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See Taylor, supra note 5, at 884.
163
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his receivables once the contract has been terminated. This
much seems self-evident. Similarly, if we are concerned about
the psychological dimension of insecurity, nothing on this score
is gained if we require assurances to remain in effect after the
contract is terminated. These rationales together seem to offer
little to the promisee who seeks to use adequate assurances to
further his interest in being made whole.
The doctrine of adequate assurances has been
applauded for its functions of fostering communication. It may
be difficult to see how the communication-inducing function of
the doctrine could be used to support extended duration of the
assurance promise. But Professor Taylor points out that section
2-609 is useful because it provides a legal reason and
framework for a promisee to notify a promisor of valuable
information:
Often [the underperforming promisor] may be unaware that the
PFB165 has serious concerns about its performance. By seeking
assurances the PFB gives notice of its perception of problems. Upon
such notice, the potentially breaching party can take steps to either
clarify that the PFB is mistaken or to remedy problems that do exist.
Demanding assurance that performance will be forthcoming thus
forces both parties to assess the status of the contract and to
communicate their understanding to each other. Assurances
encourage organic solidarity between parties by ensuring that each
remains vested in the contract. Finally, adequate assurances protect
the benefit of the bargain by recognizing the importance of the
interest in future performance and thereby promote commercial
certainty.166

Taylor’s commentary on the communication-fostering
aspect of adequate assurances is important to our
understanding of the functions and purposes of the doctrine,
but despite its elegant support for the doctrine as a whole, it
fails to provide any basis for using this aspect to assist in
answering our question about duration.
Taylor has also argued that section 2-609 can be
effective as an alternative dispute resolution device.167 If the
parties are inclined to cooperate, they can resolve their conflict
by using the mechanism of assurances. Successfully avoiding
litigation will depend on the promisor both acknowledging his
own problematic course of performance and agreeing that the
165

In Professor Taylor’s terminology, a PFB is a “party facing breach”—an
insecure party. See id. at 859.
166
Id. at 884.
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assurances requested are reasonable. Of course these
conditions are not always present, as there has been no dearth
of reported cases involving disputes over the grounds for
insecurity and the adequacy or excessiveness of the assurances
demanded.168 But even where the parties have been able to
agree on both the cause of the insecurity and the
appropriateness of the demand, there is little reason to believe
that the promisor will find anything in section 2-609 to induce
him to continue to assign his receivables after the original
contract has been terminated, without a mandate from a court.
The very absence of judicial precedent on this issue makes it
hard to imagine that a promisor would believe that he was
under any obligation to do so.
However, it is important at this point to note that we
are not here striving for a principle that will make a promisor
wish to continue to adhere to his assurances. Rather, we seek a
compelling rationale to support a particular legal rule. We do
not imagine that our arguments will in fact cause the promisor
to continue diverting his cash flows to the insecure party, but
aim to construct an obligation to do so. Moreover, the purpose
of this entire article is not simply to divine the intention of the
drafters of section 2-609, but rather to arrive at appropriate
answers to questions which, by hypothesis, the drafters have
not considered. The breach of this obligation, which we may
very well expect, will cause a legally cognizable harm, the
remedy for which will be discussed in the next Part. As we will
see, if indeed the law requires the promisor to continue to
perform the assurance promise, a very interesting question of
damages arises.
In light of this analysis, a rule supporting continued
enforcement of the assurance promises beyond the life of the
underlying contract can be said to further the purpose of
encouraging alternative dispute resolution, if in a somewhat
diffuse way, by notifying future promisors of the consequences
of failing to fully perform their assurance promises.
To a significant degree, much of the same can be said of
the view of adequate assurances as a self-help measure.
Professor Taylor has written that “section 2-609 is a powerful
statutory incorporation of self-help.”169 Taylor defines self-help
as “private actions taken by those interested in the controversy
168
169

See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
Taylor, supra note 5, at 883.
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to prevent or resolve disputes without official assistance of a
governmental official or disinterested third party.”170 Taylor’s
definition thus distinguishes self-help from alternative dispute
resolution (“ADR”) by excluding from the category of self-help
mediation, arbitration, court guided settlement efforts and the
like. But there is another important difference in the context of
adequate assurances that makes self-help a more central
rationale for the doctrine than ADR. ADR is a consensual
phenomenon. Recourse to the courts is always an option for
parties to a contractual dispute unless they have mutually
agreed, either at the time of formation or at the time of the
dispute, to pursue ADR. By contrast, self-help is more onesided; it is a mechanism for an aggrieved party to enforce his
rights without the assistance of the judiciary. With adequate
assurances, the mechanism is provided by statute and, as we
have seen, entitles the insecure promisee to extract a promise
that will allow him to receive the benefit of his bargain without
the cost, trouble, and relational harm that litigation entails.
Thus, as a matter of both judicial economy and the convenience
of the parties, the self-help function of the doctrine of adequate
assurances supports the conclusion that courts ought to rule
that the assurance promise is enforceable beyond the life-span
of the underlying contract.
We are left, then, with two final candidates to support
extended duration: the purpose of making the promisee whole
and the purpose of helping the promisee avoid excessive
reliance costs. I have saved the best for last. These final two
purposes of adequate assurances unambiguously support an
expansive view of the duration of the assurance. It bears
remembering that section 2-609 is, in fact, a remedial
provision. As such, its application ought to be informed by the
so-called “spirit of the remedies” provision of section 1-103.
This provision states that “[t]he remedies provided by this Act
shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved
party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed . . . .”171
These two rationales for the doctrine must be seen as
carrying greater weight than many of the others that have
been discussed. Communication and assuaging psychological
insecurity seem flighty and insignificant when measured
170
171

Id. at 841. I do not adhere strictly to this scheme of classification.
U.C.C. § 1-106 (revised 2001).
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against the bottom line economic realities of the parties’
relationship. Avoiding litigation, while an important function of
the doctrine, cannot be seen as more than a secondary function
in the context of a legal code that purports to provide rules
binding on the courts. Similarly, while self-help may be the
primary purpose of some legal provisions, such as those
relating to the execution of liens pursuant to a perfected
security interest, it cannot be as important as the goal of
sorting out economic rights and entitlements in a contractual
relationship. The only other rationale of comparable
importance is holding the deal together. Taken together,
making the insecure party whole and holding the deal together
are thus the two most important purposes of the doctrine. But
as we have observed, once we have limited our focus to
situations in which the underlying contract is no longer in
force, the importance of holding the deal together evaporates.
When we talk about making the insecure party whole,
we must consider two related concepts. The first is the
reduction of costs associated with the insecurity. The Official
Comment alludes to these costs, as do many commentators.172
The second, which is the immediate focus of our attention, is
the protection of the expectation or reliance interests
implicated by the promise of the assurance. These two amounts
are sometimes, but not always, the same. In our present
example of the assignment of receivables, they are the same.
When the promisee seeks to continue in the assignment
arrangement, he seeks not only the satisfaction of the promise
of the assurance, but also to receive amounts due under the
original contract.173 We will see examples in the next Part
where the assurance promise creates the possibility that the
promisor will become obligated to the promisee for amounts in
excess of any due under the original contract.
But if we acknowledge—as we must—that the drafters
of section 2-609 were concerned with the promisee’s economic
loss, and we take full account of the spirit of the remedies
section, it is hard to see why the assignment of receivables
should not continue until the promisor’s obligation is satisfied,
irrespective of the termination of the contract. The promisor
has promised to commit those cash flows to the repayment of
172

See Craswell, supra note 5, at 410-14; Garvin, supra note 5, at 112-16.
The promisee’s reliance costs are equal to the amounts he advanced to the
promisor in reliance on his promise to assign receivables. His expectation interest is
the same amount: he expects to be paid for his goods under the principal contract.
173
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the obligation, and if we are to take seriously the promissory
character of adequate assurances, then until that promise has
been fulfilled, it should be enforced.
If it is not to be enforced, the law ought to impose upon
the promisor the burden of explaining why. As we have already
discussed in Part III, the reason might be a want of
consideration. But if the insecure promisee was well-counseled,
he may have had the forethought to offer something in exchange
for the promise. Alternatively, the promisee may have
detrimentally relied on the promise (a wrinkle we will revisit in
the next Part). The promisor might argue that his promise was
coerced, but absent strong facts suggesting duress, he is not
likely to succeed on that issue. Finally, the strongest possibility
for categorically denying enforcement of the assurance promise
once the original contract has come to an end lies in the
possibility of treating the assurance promise as a modification of
the original contract, rather than as a separate contract. We
shall explore that possibility in the Epilogue.
In sum, there appears to be no reason to categorically
deny enforcement of the assurance promise under the
circumstances presented by our hypothetical. It is possible that
the facts of the particular case will furnish reasons to do so, but
at this point, there remains a strong case to be made for
embracing the promissory character of adequate assurances and
enforcing the assurance promise as a contract in its own right.
To the extent that we view adequate assurances as a
doctrine whose primary purpose is to hold the deal together, we
would be disinclined to conclude that certain assurance promises
should endure in force after termination or breach, for once the
promisee’s own performance obligations have come to an end,
the insecurity, and thus the need for the assurances, vanishes.
Yet, as the language of the Official Comment makes
clear, holding the deal together is not the only rationale for the
doctrine.174 It fosters other values, such as promoting
communication between parties, encouraging dispute
resolution, creating a self-help mechanism, and, above all,
minimizing the promisee’s economic loss.175 When we consider
these other purposes, particularly ensuring that an injured
party is compensated for his loss, it makes less sense to
conclude that the assignment should stop once the contract is
174
175

U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (revised 2003).
Id.
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terminated. If we treat the new promise as enduring even after
the original contract has terminated, then we are embracing a
view of adequate assurances as a sort of self-help remedy. The
insecure party has been harmed and is empowered by law to
extract a promise that will help make him whole. Until he has
been made whole, the promise should retain its legal effect.
The question of duration is evidently a complicated one,
which the courts have not yet adequately addressed. I hope I
have presented a framework for thinking about how to resolve
it. Ultimately, it probably ought to be answered with reference
to the facts of an individual case, and will depend upon the
courts coming to a clearer view of which of the competing
rationales for adequate assurances is the most compelling.
Whichever view of duration eventually prevails, there remains
one final set of issues—indeed the most important set for
litigants—to be addressed.
V.

CONSEQUENCES FOR DAMAGES

Apart from—and probably more important than—the
implications for the duration of the promise, treating an
assurance as an independently enforceable contract raises the
question of what damages might be available for its breach.
Specifically, can the injured party recover the full measure of
damages for the breach of the assurance promise even where
the original contract provided for some limitation on remedies?
Such restrictions can take many forms, including stipulated
damages, limitation to repair or replacement of defective parts,
and exclusion of consequential damages.
In this part, I would like to explore the proposition that
if the assurances comprise an enforceable promise, then the
limitations on damages from the original contract should not
apply to the new contract. The appeal of this position rests in
logic, but there may be doctrinal or theoretical reasons that
militate against it. To aid in our discussion of these
considerations, consider the following hypothetical conflict that
illustrates how the issue might arise.
Suppose we have a buyer and a seller who enter into a
contract for the manufacture and sale of a specialized piece of
machinery. The buyer has notified the seller about special
losses he will suffer if the goods are not delivered in working
order by a certain date. Despite the buyer’s disclosure that he
will lose significant amounts of profitable business with each
week the machine is late, the parties’ contract limits
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consequential damages to one thousand dollars per week for
lateness. Alternatively, we might imagine that the damages
are simply limited to the cost of repair or replacement. As
things turn out, before the time for delivery has arrived, the
seller is having trouble getting the machine to work properly
and announces that delivery will be delayed. The buyer, feeling
insecure, demands assurances from the seller, specifically,
retaining a special consultant to redesign the machine and
troubleshoot the manufacturing process. The seller promises to
do this. It comes to pass that the seller, confident that she will
be able to solve the problem herself, and wishing to avoid the
added expense of the expert consultant, never actually enlists
the help of the expert, and the machine is never properly
delivered.
The seller has thus conceivably breached two contracts.
Can the buyer sue on that second promise and avoid the
limitation of damages that is contained in the principal
contract, but not agreed to in the context of the assurances? If
the promise of the assurance is treated as a contract, and the
buyer suffers damages that are ordinarily recoverable under
law, then the buyer ought to recover his full loss. Yet this
conclusion may strike some readers as wrong at an intuitive
level.
As we consider whether some legal principle informs our
uneasiness with this conclusion, we should acknowledge a
fundamental factual assumption built into this hypothetical.
This story assumes that the parties never bothered to work out
the details of their assurances agreement. This is a completely
realistic assumption; the cases reveal that parties pay
relatively little attention to their assurances. In fact, as we
have seen, parties sometimes do not even realize that they
have actually demanded and given assurances.176 Indeed, in his
study of a sampling of cases on adequate assurances, Professor
James J. White reached this very conclusion, asserting that
most cases do not involve a highly conscious or formal process
of demanding and giving assurances; rather, they are decided
on the basis of a judge’s construction of the parties’ haphazard,
even unintentional, invocation of the doctrine.177
Thus, another way of looking at this problem of
damages is that it is one of incomplete contracts and default
176
177

See supra notes 121-43 and accompanying text.
See White, supra note 5, at 857-59.
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rules.178 In other words, we can say that the problem for our
buyer and seller is that, in agreeing to the assurances, they
failed to negotiate and memorialize any agreement about the
availability of consequential damages or damages otherwise in
excess of those recoverable under the original contract.
The theory of default rules proceeds from the
recognition that a fully specified contract—one in which the
parties contemplate all possible contingencies and negotiate
their contract to provide for them—is an impossibility.179 Parties
economize on transaction costs by negotiating only the most
important terms, employing boilerplate, and leaving the
resulting gaps to be filled by contract law, which supplies the
default rules that will govern the situations that the parties
themselves have not provided for.180 Default rules can be
broadly classed into two groups: majoritarian defaults and
penalty defaults. A majoritarian default is one designed to
approximate the rule most parties would have agreed to, had
they taken the time to negotiate over the issue.181 Majoritarian
defaults thus are intended to be intuitive and unobjectionable,
and often involve standards of reasonableness.182
Contract theorists have identified a second form of
default rule, described as a penalty default. A penalty default,
as the name suggests, is designed to penalize one party or
another, creating a winner and loser ex ante.183 This sort of rule
may be desirable to the extent that it has its intended effect:
forcing parties to reveal information and bargain over the term
in question before entering into the contract.184 This
“information-forcing” effect, in turn, can increase the value of
the contract to the parties and reduce the likelihood of
litigation.185 Also, since the information the parties have
revealed to each other is often memorialized in the contract,
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See Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Assent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992)
[hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Contractual Inefficiency]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE
L.J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps].
179
Ayres & Gertner, Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 178, at 730.
180
Id. at 731.
181
Id.
182
Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 178, at 91.
183
Id. at 95-100.
184
Id. at 97.
185
Ayres & Gertner, Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 178, at 735.
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the parties are ultimately revealing more information to the
courts, which reduces the costs of litigation should any ensue.186
In the context of this discussion, the question then
becomes, what is the best default rule to govern the question of
whether the insecure party can recover damages from the
breach of the assurance promise in excess of those available
under the principal contract? Let us first consider the best
majoritarian default. The primary explanation for the
incompleteness of contracts is, as mentioned above,
economizing on transaction costs. It seems rather obvious to
suppose that the damages rule most parties would prefer would
be one that carries over the damages rule the parties had
agreed to in their principal contract (I will call that the
Carryover Rule). Having expended the time and resources to
negotiate limitations on damages when forming their contract
(recall the hypothetical), the parties would not agree ex ante to
a rule that nullifies the effect of their earlier effort and requires
them to renegotiate the same issue in the stressful context of
their deteriorating relationship (which I will call the
Independent Damages Rule). I take this line of reasoning to be
the basis for any intuitive discomfort we might have with an
Independent Damages Rule. The Carryover Rule would also
have the advantage of being a rule that most business persons
would expect to govern. As they are not excessively focused on
obscure questions of law, we might expect them to think, why
would the law disregard the agreement we have already
reached on the availability of damages?187
The Independent Damages Rule, on the other hand,
would make an appropriate penalty default. Since the
underperforming promisor would be liable for greater damages
under this rule, she would have an incentive to negotiate with
the insecure party over this term at the time she gives the
assurances. This is not to say that she would necessarily
186

Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 178, at 97.
Imputing this sort of common-sense reasoning to business persons
comports with Llewellyn’s view of what a body of commercial law ought to be. See
Snyder, supra note 43, at 22-25. Llewellyn wrote:
187

The legal profession needs to have the men of commerce think of law and
legal work, not as a baffling intricacy of ununderstandable [sic] technicality,
but as a helpful device which can be seen, directly, to be helpful though safety
requires the use of a lawyer’s skills in developing its help. . . . Commercial
law requires to be for consumption by commercial men, as well as lawyers.
Memorandum from Karl Llewellyn on The Reasons for a Uniform Commercial Code (c.
1940), in WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 524-35 (1973).
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convince her counterpart to agree to alter the rule, but it might
have the beneficial effect of inducing her to reveal information
about the likelihood of her actually performing the new
obligation she has undertaken. It would also cause her to
compare the cost of non-performance with the cost of
performance. This, in turn, could lead either to a more
complete negotiation of the assurances, or to a reconfiguration
of the original damages arrangement. Information about the
likelihood of her compliance with the assurances would also
assist the insecure party in determining the extent to which he
should continue to rely on the principal contract and her
assurances. Perhaps he has the opportunity to seek substitute
goods elsewhere, make alternative arrangement with his
customers, or hedge in some other manner. Finally, the
information-forcing nature of the Independent Damages Rule
would create greater certainty and predictability in any future
litigation, for the parties would likely have memorialized any
understanding they reached during their negotiations, and this
documentation would aid a court in determining and enforcing
the parties’ intentions.
To appreciate another way that the information-forcing
character of a penalty default could be useful, consider a
variation to our hypothetical. Assume now that in negotiating
the original contract, the buyer had not spelled out the likely
loss he would realize if the seller were to deliver the machine
late and that the only limitation on damages is a repair or
replacement clause. Suppose also that the buyer has received
substantial orders for goods that will be made with the seller’s
machine. If the Independent Damages Rule were in place, it
would operate to induce the buyer to reveal to the seller the
potential loss if she does not deliver the machine promptly.
Armed with this information, and the knowledge that she will
be liable under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale188 for lost profits
incurred by the buyer, the seller will be able to make a betterinformed judgment about how much effort to put into
performing. This knowledge might also cause her to reevaluate
whether in fact it is efficient for her to give the assurances the
buyer requested; perhaps it would be better for her to breach
the original contract and either settle with the buyer or leave
herself liable only for the damages set out in the original
contract.
188

(1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ct. Exch.); 9 Exch. Rep. 341.
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The foregoing discussion suggests that while the
Carryover Damages Rule may comport with our intuition about
what damages ought to be available, it tends to reinforce a
problem that seems endemic to the adequate assurances
process: the fact that parties appear not to pay sufficient
attention to it.
Our discussion of the damages rule has, to this point,
proceeded in reference to a hypothetical involving the
availability of expectation damages. I consider this to be, in
general, the weaker case for invoking the Independent
Damages Rule.189 I will now introduce a hypothetical that
presents detrimental reliance as the basis for imposing such a
rule. Suppose an individual has hired an architect to design
and build an architecturally significant house. The architect is
running into a variety of problems, giving the landowner
reasonable grounds for insecurity. In response to the buyer’s
demand, the architect promises to bring in Frank Gehry as a
consultant to solve the design problems. The buyer is delighted
at having extracted this promise, and perceives that his house
will be much more valuable when it becomes known that Frank
Gehry was a design consultant for the house. He informs other
wealthy architecture enthusiasts about his soon-to-be-built
Frank Gehry home. He then enters into a contract to sell the
home. As it turns out, the architect completes the house on
time and perfectly according to specification. But, as you have
probably guessed, he never hired Frank Gehry.

189

My sense of the comparative weakness of the case of expectation damages
is of a piece with Fuller and Perdue’s classic evaluation of the relative strength of the
moral claims of the expectation, reliance, and restitution interests in contract law. As
Fuller and Perdue explain:
[T]he promisee who has actually relied on the promise, even though he may
not thereby have enriched the promisor, certainly presents a more pressing
case for relief than the promisee who merely demands satisfaction for his
disappointment in not getting what was promised him. In passing from
compensation for change of position to compensation for loss of expectancy we
pass, to use Aristotle’s terms again, from the realm of corrective justice to
that of distributive justice. The law no longer seeks merely to heal a
disturbed status quo, but to bring into being a new situation. It ceases to act
defensively or restoratively, and assumes a more active role. With the
transition, the justification for legal relief loses its self-evident quality. It is
as a matter of fact no easy thing to explain why the normal rule of contract
recovery should be that which measures damages by the value of the
promised performance.
Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (Pt.
I), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 55-56 (1936).
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This hypothetical presents two important features that
challenge our understanding of the promissory character of
adequate assurances of performance. First, we have a promisor
who has fully performed his contract without any breach
whatsoever. Second, the promisee’s reliance loss seems to be
unrelated to the undertakings of the original contract. I have
designed this hypothetical to strain the view of adequate
assurances I have endorsed throughout this article. In this
scenario, almost all of the values that adequate assurances
aims to further are out the window. We are not holding the
deal together. The promisee’s opportunistic reselling of his
Frank Gehry house has nothing to do with either the
psychological or economic dimensions of insecurity. In
performing the principal contract, the builder has made the
promisee whole. Finally, we may have a residual intuitive
sense that enforcing this promise simply is not what the
doctrine of adequate assurances is all about.
However, at a certain level, none of these considerations
is really relevant at all. For what we have is a promise—a
promise that was detrimentally relied upon. We enforce
promises either because they were given for consideration, or
because they were detrimentally relied upon. In fact, as Fuller
and Perdue (not to mention Aristotle)190 have argued, we are
more concerned with enforcing promises when the promisor, by
making the promise, has caused harm to the promisee. Now
certainly, in this case, the promisee might have trouble with
some of the doctrinal requirements of promissory estoppel. This
might not be a winning case because a court might conclude
that nonenforcement would not be unjust; or perhaps that this
sort of reliance was not foreseeable by the promisor. But all we
would have to do is change a few facts (and not in a terribly
unrealistic way) to bring this hypothetical within the ambit of
section 90.191 In any event, though the details of this
hypothetical may make it an inappropriate case for
enforcement, its structure forces us to confront the fact that
adequate assurances often involve promises that can be relied
upon, and that there is no obvious reason why the harm caused
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ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 109-14 (J. A. Ackrill & J. O. Urmson
eds., David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
191
For example, if the builder simply knew that the landowner was not
planning to live in the house, but to sell it for a profit, the chances for success under
section 90 would be significantly higher.
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by such promises should be treated differently under law than
other promises.
In this Part, I have shown that if we take seriously the
promissory character of adequate assurances—if we accept that
they can be enforceable promises—then we must confront
practical considerations of the highest order, namely, the
availability of damages for breach of contract. I have shown the
practical significance of this issue through the exposition of
realistic hypotheticals that demonstrate that real-world
litigants would have a serious financial interest in the conflicts
I have constructed. Although I do not claim that principles of
contract law require the adoption of the Independent Damages
Rule, I have provided a factual and theoretical framework for
thinking about the question and have given meaningful
reasons in support of the rule.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of adequate assurances of performance
has, since its inception, been relegated to the periphery of
contract law. By highlighting the promissory character of
adequate assurances, I hope to have convinced readers that the
doctrine implicates the issues that rest at the very heart of
contract theory. I have demonstrated that assurances can take
the form of promises that deserve to be treated by the law as
enforceable contracts. I have also explored the consequences
that would follow from such a treatment, and most
importantly, its effect on damages flowing from the breach of
the assurance promise.
If one accepts my basic claim about the enforceability of
these promises, then the difficult questions of duration and
damages addressed in this article ought to provoke more
attention from scholars. The next step in resolving these issues
involves moving beyond the doctrinal, logical, and functional
analyses that were the modalities of this article, and engaging
in a more thoroughgoing theoretical analysis focusing on
theories of promise and damages.

EPILOGUE
The purpose of this article has been to present an
account of assurances that takes their promissory character
seriously. A significant implication of such a treatment is that
it forces us to consider the impact on damages if the promise of
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the assurances is breached. Specifically, if the assurance is
treated as a promise giving rise to a contract, then logically,
the breach of that promise would give rise to damages
independent of those available under the original contract.
Similarly, we have seen that treating the assurance promise as
a contract would lead us to think that the promise would
remain enforceable even after the original contract was no
longer in force. We have marshaled a variety of arguments—
pro and con—on the questions of duration and damages, but in
each case, we were working without the benefit of a clear legal
rule that could neatly resolve these issues.
We have, however, hinted at the existence of such a
simple means of resolution. Although the courts have not
addressed the question, one can easily imagine a court treating
the promise of the assurance as a modification of the original
contract. Such a maneuver would obviate (or at least greatly
simplify) the inquiry into whether the breach of the assurance
promise could give rise to damages different from those
available for breach of the underlying contract, or how long the
assurance promise was to remain in effect. If the courts
categorically treated assurances as modifications, then there
would be no question of damages under a separate contract and
no confusion over duration.
But it is not clear that the courts would disfavor
treating the promise of the assurance as a distinct promise, one
with its own integrity and one whose breach could give rise to
damages that might not be available under the initial contract.
This line of inquiry requires consideration of a slightly modified
question; namely, which new promises between parties to a
contract amount to a modification and which amount to a new
contract? Unfortunately, the law of modification does not
provide a clear doctrinal framework for answering that
question. Moreover, there exists an ample scholarly literature
on modification that completely overlooks this question.192 Yet
this omission cannot be ascribed to the notion that the question
is too rarefied or esoteric to merit an applicable legal rule.
192

See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680 (1982); Thomas J. Miceli, Over a Barrel:
Contract Modification, Reliance and Bankruptcy, 22 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 41 (2002);
John E. Murray, Jr., The Modification Mysters: Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1987); Irma S. Russell, Reinventing the Deal: A Sequential
Approach to Analyzing Claims for Enforcement of Modified Sales Contracts, 53 FLA. L.
REV. 49 (2001); Snyder, supra note 121; Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and
Modification Under Revised Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305 (1994).
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Indeed, multiple promises are a very common occurrence
between contracting parties. Consider the following example.
Buyer and seller have a contract under which buyer
agrees to purchase all of its requirements of soda from the
seller, with a minimum quantity of one thousand cases of soda
per month for a year. Buyer and seller agree that the varieties
of soda will be determined at the time of the placement of each
purchase order, once a week, at seller’s posted wholesale price.
In the middle of the contract, seller introduces a new item to its
product lineup: iced tea. If the parties agree that buyer will
start purchasing iced tea, have they made a new contract or
modified their original agreement?
As this hypothetical suggests, there is nothing
exceptional about parties to an executory contract making new
promises. There are several ways the parties might address
these new promises that bear on the question at hand. They
might document the new promise with a new form agreement,
indicating a subjective intention that the new promise
constitutes a new contract. They might explicitly indicate their
intention that the new promise acts as a modification of their
original agreement. Parties with ongoing relationships also
commonly execute master contracts which contemplate new
undertakings and provide for easy documentation, such as
purchase orders, for any subsequent orders. Alternatively, the
parties might not give any thought whatsoever to the
classification of the new promise as a modification or separate
contract.
The Restatement offers some insight into the question,
but it does not necessarily answer our question. A somewhat
obscure Comment to section 231 of the Second Restatement
provides some doctrinal guidance.
When each party gives more than one promise, or gives some
performance in addition to a promise, it may not be clear whether
there is a single exchange of promises resulting in a single contract
or separate exchanges resulting in separate contracts. If every
promise by one party is at least part of the consideration for every
promise by the other party, there is a single exchange in which all of
the promises on each side are exchanged for all of those on the other
side. . . . The form of the agreement is not controlling, and the actual
bargain of the parties is not to be determined merely by reference to
such criteria as whether separate performances are made the subject
of a single promise or of separate promises, whether separate
promises are contained in a single writing or in separate writings, or
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whether the understanding of the parties is entirely written or oral
or is partly written and partly oral.193

While, on first reading, this text seems to offer the
promise of some guidance for our question, this impression
largely dissolves when one grasps the actual purpose of this
complex passage. The purpose of this rule is to resolve disputes
over
whether
two
contracts,
executed
essentially
simultaneously, but in separate documents, ought to be treated
as a single contract or as two contracts. While the factual
scenario contemplated by the rule is distinct from the one
under consideration in this article, it is conceptually related,
and therefore worthy of some further discussion.
Consider the following scenario and commentary: X
owns a bowling alley and would like to sell it, but wishes to
continue working after he sells his business. He agrees to sell
the business to Y for an amount that reflects the fair value of
the business. The two parties execute an agreement of sale at a
lawyer’s office, and at the same time execute another written
agreement under which X will work for Y as a manager for
$75,000 per year. Three weeks later and before the sale
transaction closes, Y unjustifiably fires X. May X refuse to
complete the sale of the business to Y? As Professor John
Murray’s treatise explains,
The determination of whether there is one contract or two contracts
is highly significant. If there are two contracts, Y has breached the
employment contract and X has breached the sales contract.
However, if there is only one contract, Y has breached the single
contract and X has not breached since X was excused from any
further performance of his duties to complete the transfer of the
business upon the breach of duty by Y.194

The test offered by the Restatement requires a court to focus on
the intent of the parties, rather than the form of the
agreement.195
So we have here a legal rule that to some degree
addresses the question of whether a subsequent promise
constitutes a separate contract. But we also must recognize
that the rule is meant to apply to separate promises that were
made at the time of formation. Still, the consequence of the
classification (one contract or two) affects the very question
193
194
195

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 cmt. d (1981).
JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 105, at 659 (4th ed. 2001).
Id.
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about damages that is fundamental to the problem of
assurances we are exploring in this article. Regrettably, by
making the parties’ intent the key to resolving the question,
the Restatement effectively abstains from providing any
meaningful guidance that might be of use in distinguishing a
modification from a new contract.
Contract law has other minor doctrines that, when
viewed at a distance, appear promisingly to address issues
analogous to ours. Among these are accord and satisfaction,
novation, and the doctrine of substituted contracts. Yet these
too prove to be dead ends. In the absence of a clear,
comprehensive method of distinguishing between modifications
and new contracts, a court interested in classifying assurance
promises as modifications would be left to resort either to an
intention-of-the-parties analysis, or a functional analysis of the
sort we engaged in in Parts IV and V.

